Introduction
Ia mg rateful for this opportunity to discuss with philosophers some difficult issues common to philosophya nd AI. It is increasingly difficult to keep up with all the relevant literature, and only mutual aid can prevent time-wasting re-invention of wheels and blundering down blind alleys.
My topic is a specialised variant of the old philosophical question 'could a machine think?'. Some say it is only a matter of time before computer-based artefacts will behave as if theyhad thoughts and perhaps evenfeelings, pains or anyother occupants of the human mind, conscious or unconscious. I shall not pre-judge this issue. The space of possible computing systems is so vast, and we have explored such a tinycorner,that it would be as rash to pronounce on what we may or may not discoveri no ur future explorations as to predict what might or might not be expressible in print shortly after its invention. Instead I'll merely try to clarify what we might look for.
LikeS earle ( [11, 12] ) I'll focus on a specific type of thought, namely understanding symbols. Clearly,a rtefacts likec ard-sorters, optical character readers, voice-controlled machines, and automatic translators, manipulate symbols. Do theyu nderstand the symbols? Some machines behave asiftheydo, at least in a primitive way.Theyrespond to commands by performing tasks; theyp rint out answers to questions; theyp araphrase stories or answer questions about them. Weunderstand the symbols, but do THEY?
Is real understanding missing from simulated understanding just as real wetness is missing from a simulated tornado? Or is a mental process likec alculation: if simulated in detail, it is replicated?
If 'understanding' denotes some logically private internal state which can only be defined ostensively by pointing inside yourself, then the question whether machines can understand becomes undiscussable, liket he question whether the earth is or is not at the same point in absolute space as it was a year ago. Two people 'pointing' inside themselves cannot be sure theya re talking about the same thing when theya sk whether machines, or ev eno ther people, have it. Arguments from analogy need a theory which indicates why certain common aspects of the body or brain might be sufficient to produce understanding. And that requires some kind of non-ostensive,f unctional, analysis of what understanding is, just as questions about identity of locations require locations to be relative toa framework of reference.
In that case, understanding is defined in terms of a collection of capabilities with a certain structure and certain functions. It is not a simple state, and it may be present in different degrees of sophistication. In this functional sense there is a discussable question whether machines could everunderstand the symbols theymanipulate. This does not imply that there will be a determinate answer.
We'lls ee that our ordinary concept of 'understanding' denotes a complexc luster of capabilities, and different subsets of these may be exhibited in different people, animals or machines. Toa sk 'which are necessary for REAL understanding?' is to attribute spurious precision to a concept of ordinary language. Hence there is no clear boundary between things that do and things that do not understand symbols.
Ishall list 'prototypical' characteristics of human use of symbols with understanding, and discuss conditions under which these characteristics might be found in machines. Then instead of answering either 'YES' or 'NO' to the question whether suitably programmed computers can understand, we note that within the space of possible 'behaving systems' there are indefinitely manyc ases, some sharing more features with human minds, some fewer.The important task is to analyse the nature and the implications of these similarities and differences, and not to argue about which cases existing labels 'really' fit.
The space of possible systems is not a continuum. There are manyd iscontinuities that makeadifference to functional capabilities. So we are not talking about differences in degree, likedifferences in speed or memory size, but differences in structure and function, liket he difference between having eyes and not having them, or the difference between legs and wheels. There is not just one crucial division. There are very manyd ifferences between amoebas and people, no one of which is the 'essential' one which makes us conscious or intelligent, just as there is no one 'essential' difference between chess and football.
Analysing complexcapabilities and distinctions in the space of possible systems can help theoretical biology by presenting a framework for questions about the evolution of behaviour.I tc an help psychologists by clarifying the nature of the capabilities theya re attempting to study.Itcan help computing science and artificial intelligence by identifying precise newengineering targets for the future.
Philosophers can help by identifying confusions, gaps and errors in the analysis of capabilities we all knowa bout, and extending the analysis to a far wider range of mental concepts. Ordinary philosophical analysis needs to be extended by adopting what Dennett [3] calls the design stance. For example, by analysing possible computational mechanisms instead of just behavioural or phenomenological analyses, we can hope to achieve theories with greater generative power,and therefore greater depth and clarity.
II

What is understanding a language?
Iu se the word 'language' loosely as equivalent to 'notation', 'representational scheme', 'symbol system' etc. Very roughly,al anguage L is a system of symbols used by some agent U in relation to a world W.' System' implies a generative notation, with compositional semantics. I use 'agent' without implying purposiveness. For nowI w ant to leave itopen whether the use of symbols presupposes purposiveness in all cases, though it obviously does in some. The word 'use' may be thought to imply purposiveness, but I intend it to be taken in the sense in which a plant uses oxygen, without having anypurpose or intention.
Av oice-drivenj uke-box would relate spoken numbers to a world of records in a rack. The jukebox'slimited behavioural repertoire makes it inappropriate to describe it as doing anything more than relating certain symbols to objects. It does not, for instance, relate symbols to properties, relations or states of affairs. Its world W contains a very restricted class of events, and every symbol refers implicitly to that class, merely indicating which object (which record) should partakei nt he event. The sorts of symbol-users we'll be interested in will generally be far more sophisticated. Theymay be able to use symbols in L to refer not only to objects but also to different properties, relations, events, processes, or actions in W.And theycan do different things with their symbols.
In simple cases evidence that U uses a symbol S to refer to object O consists of bidirectional causal links. (a) occurrences of S, manipulated by U, may cause U to do something involving O. For instance, finding 'the big red block' in an input string may cause U to pick up a certain block. (b) a happening involving O may cause U to do something with the symbol S. Sensors detecting that a certain block is moving might cause Utobuild a structure containing the string 'the big red block'.
Symbol manipulations need not be externally detectable. A computing system may do things internally which cannot be inferred from its behaviour,a nd it may have neither tracing programs, nor access to an output medium capable of displaying the internal detail (see ch 10 of [13] ). Unlikeb ehaviourists I am talking about the very kind of internal behaviour which behaviourists try to analyse away.
Af ull analysis would distinguish different kinds of: (a) symbol media, (b) grammatical rules (c) semantic rules (d) mechanisms for manipulating symbols, (e) symbol users, (f) worlds, and (g) purposes for which symbols might be used. This paper discusses only a subset of this rich array of possibilities.
Symbols are structures that can be stored, compared with other structures, searched for,etc. Theymay be simple or complex(i.e. composed of parts which are symbols). They may be physical, likemarks on a piece of paper,orvirtual symbols, i.e. abstract structures in a virtual machine, like5 -D arrays in a computer (See [17] ). Theym ay be internal or external. Theyn eed not be separable physical objects or events, since a single travelling wave may 'carry' different symbols simultaneously,a nd a network of active computing nodes may have sev eral patterns distributively superimposed in its current state in holographic fashion. A set of bits may represent one Godel number corresponding to a set of sentences.
Symbols include maps, descriptions, representations, of all kinds, including computer programs, and non-denoting symbols, likep arentheses and other syntactic devices. (In fact, anything at all can be used as a symbol.)
The symbols need not be used for external communication. Meaning and understanding are often assumed (e.g. [8] ) to be essentially concerned with communication between language users. As argued in [14] , this is a mistake, since understanding of an external language is secondary to the use of an internal symbolism for storing information, reasoning, making plans, forming percepts and motives, etc. This is prior in (a) ev olutionary terms, (b) in relation to individual learning, and (c) insofar as the use of an external language requires internal computations. Representation is prior to communication.
Objects in the world W may be concrete (e.g. physical objects) or abstract (e.g. numbers, grammatical rules). Theym ay be external, or internal to U. W need not be uniquely decomposable into objects, relations, etc. E.g. a human torso is not uniquely decomposable. Likesymbols, the objects may exist in a virtual world, embodied in a lower levelw orld, likeav irtual machine implemented in a lower levelc omputer.M any programming languages refer to objects in a virtual world, such as lists, arrays, procedures, etc. Similarly social systems form a virtual world embedded in a psychological and physical world.
III
The structureofthe concept 'understanding'
Ap rototypical set of conditions for saying that U uses some collection of symbols as a language L referring to objects in a world W is presented below. Different combinations of conditions define different concepts of 'language', 'meaning', 'understanding', etc. Asking which is the 'RIGHT' concept is pointless.
Some are 'structural' conditions concerned with what mechanisms for understanding do. Some are 'functional' conditions, concerned with what understanding is used for,a nd howthe mechanisms contribute to a larger functional architecture.
We can treat the conditions as a set of axioms implicitly defining 'use of symbols with understanding'. We'll see that events and processes in a computer can constitute a model for a significant subset of the axioms. Moreover, iti sn ot just an abstract model. Unlikes imulations of (e.g.) tornadoes, computer models of mental processes can have the same causal relations to the rest of the world as natural mental processes. People outside the model can relate to a machine model as to the real thing (though some may not wish to). A robot may obeyc ommands, answer questions, teach you things. But a simulated tornado will not makeyou wet or cold.
We'llsee that computers can manipulate internal structures and use them as symbols associated with what Woods, in [21] , calls a 'directly accessible' world W consisting of both entities within the machine and more abstract entities liken umbers and symbolpatterns. (Cohen [2] also points this out.) Later,w ed iscuss reference to an 'external' world.
IV
Prototypical conditions for U to use L to refer to W
•L i sas et containing simple and complexs ymbols, the latter being composed of the former,inaprincipled fashion, according to syntactic rules.
•Ua ssociates some symbols of L with objects in W,a nd other symbols with properties, relations, or actions in W.
These condition are satisfied by most computer languages, though machine codes generally have very simple syntax. Ac omputer can associate 'addresses' (usually bit-patterns) with locations in its memory (possibly a virtual memory) and other symbols with their contents and relationships. The symbols cause processes to be directed to or influenced by specific parts of this internal 'world' W.S ome of the symbols specify which processes -i.e. they name actions in W. Va rious sorts of properties and relations may be symbolised in a machine language, e.g. equality of content of addresses, neighbourhood in the machine, arithmetic relations, etc.
Instructions have imperative meanings because theys ystematically cause actions to occur.Theymay have independently variable components, e.g. object, instrument, manner, location, time, etc.
If U is a computer and L its machine code, the semantic relation is causal:
'S refers to O for U' = 'S makes U'sactivities relate to or involveO, and facts involving O affect U'suse of S'
where O may be an object, property,relation or type of action.
•Some objects referred to in world W may be abstract, e.g. numbers.
Computers can use certain symbols to denote numbers because theya re manipulated by arithmetical procedures and used as loop counters, address increments, array subscripts etc.
(Compare [2] .) Computers can count their own operations, or elements of a list that satisfy some test. This has much in common with a young child'sunderstanding of number words -theyare just a sequence of symbols used in certain counting activities ( [13] ch.7).
•W hat a complexs ymbol S expresses for U depends on its structure, its more primitive components and some set of interpretation rules related to the syntactic rules U uses for L. I.e. L has compositional semantics (
This is true of manyc omputer languages. E.g. what is denoted by a complexa rithmetical expression, or a complexi nstruction, depends on what the parts denote, and howt heya re put together according to the syntactic rules of the language.
•Adistinction can be made between the reference and the sense of symbols, i.e. between what theyrefer to and howtheyrefer.
As imple example to be found in computers would be the difference between two numerical expressions which necessarily denote the same number,b ut as the result of different calculations. Similarly,two expressions may access the same internal data but via different routes.
•Itissometimes suggested that real use of a language requires that the mapping between symbols and objects be arbitrary,e.g. unlike'clouds mean rain'. This is partly true of computer languages. However, total arbitrariness would be inconsistent with compositional semantics, and the use of systematic names.
•Ucan treat the symbols of L as 'objects', i.e. can examine them, compare them, change them, etc., though not necessarily consciously.
This applies to computers. Symbolic patterns used to refer can also be referred to, compared, transformed, copied, etc. It is not clear whether other animals can or need to treat their internal symbols as objects. This may be a pre-requisite for some kinds of learning.
•Certain symbols in L express conditionality. •Bye xamining W,Ucan distinguish formulas in L that assert something true from those asserting something false.
Computers typically use symbols for Boolean operations e.g. 'or', 'and', 'not' and two 'truth-values'. Theya re taken as truth-values partly because of their role in conditional imperatives. Truth-values can be assigned by examining internal states or arithmetical relations.
•Ucan detect that stored symbols contain errors and takecorrective action.
E.g. programs can attempt to eliminate wrong inferences derivedf rom noisy data, e.g. in vision, and plan-executors can check whether the assumptions underlying a plan are still true. This supports a richer conception of a truth-value than just twoarbitrary symbols.
•Acomplexsymbol S with a boolean value may be used for different purposes by U, for instance: questioning (specifying information to be found), instructing (specifying actions), asserting (storing information for future use).
Sfunctions as a primitive question in a conditional instruction where action depends on the answer to the question. In lowl ev elm achine languages there is not usually the possibility of using the same symbol to express the content of an imperative asi n" MakeSt rue". I.e. •Uc an make inferences by deriving news ymbols in L from old ones, in order to determine some semantic relation (e.g. proofs preservet ruth, refutations demonstrate falsity).
Work in AI has demonstrated mechanisms for doing this, albeit in a restricted and mostly uncreative fashion so far.
•Ln eed not be a fixed, static, system: it may be extendable, to cope with expanding requirements.
Manyc omputer languages are extendable. Adaptive dialogue systems are beginning to showh ow a machine may extend its own language according to need. But deep concept formation is still some way off. It is not clear which animals can and which cannot extend their internal languages. Without this, certain other forms of learning may be impossible.
•Um ay use symbols of L to formulate goals, purposes, or intentions; or to represent hypothetical possibilities for purposes of planning or prediction.
Simple versions of this sort of thing are AI planning systems. Only a system whose functional architecture supports distinctions between beliefs, desires, plans, suppositions, etc., can assign meanings in the way that we do. Merely storing information, and deriving consequences, or executing instructions, leaveso ut a major component of human understanding, i.e. that what we understand matters to us. For information to matter to a machine it must have its own desires, preferences, likes, dislikes, etc. This presupposes that there are modules whose function is to create or modify goals -motive generators. Full flexibility requires motive-generator generators. Deciding and planning require motive comparators and motive-comparator-generators. This is spelled out a little more in [15] . Motivesg enerated internally overm anyy ears, refute the claim that a machine can exhibit only desires of the programmer or user.S uch a machine would use symbols in L for its purposes. This is an important boundary in the space of possible behaving systems. Without this structure a machine might understand well enough to be a slavish servant, but could not be entrusted with tasks requiring creativity and drive,l ikem anaging a large company or minding children.
•Lm ay be used for communication between individuals. This adds newr equirements ( [21] ), which I shall not discuss, since representation is prior to communication.
All the conditions so far listed for U to use a language L in relation to a world W are consistent with U being a computer.S ev eral do not evenr equire AI programs, since modern computers are built able to use symbols to refer to a world W containing numbers, locations in memory,t he patterns of symbols found in those locations, properties and relations of such patterns, and actions that change W.
V
Does the computer really understand?
Searle'sc laim that computers appear to understand only because people interpret the symbols, i.e. the process has only 'derivative'i ntentionality,i gnores the fact that a substantial portion of the structure of the concept of 'using a symbol with a meaning' is exemplified evenw ithout AI programs. Associations between program elements and things in the computer'sw orld define a primitive type of meaning that the computer itself attaches to symbols. Its use of the symbols has features analogous to simpler cases of human understanding, and quite unmatched by jukeboxes. So it does not interpret symbols merely derivatively: the causal relations justify our using intentional descriptions, without anthropomorphism. Tos imulate or replicate human types of intentionality,i ncluding beliefs, desires, plans, fears, attention and self-consciousness, requires the embedding of individual mental processes in a suitable network of co-operative processes with intricate divisions of functions.
In short, though structural requirements for at least the simplest sorts of understanding are relatively easy to achieve, functional requirements are harder.W ek now howt om akem echanisms capable of producing intentional states. However, tob e intentional processes likeh uman mental processes, the symbol-manipulations must themselves have additional causal powers: the power to affect beliefs, desires, plans, and the actions theyp roduce. This requires connections with additional procedures and databases concerned with the use of symbols in a manner characteristic of beliefs, desires, plans, etc. All this is possible eveni fWis a purely internal world, liket he world of a dedicated, enthusiastic mathematician. 
Reference to inaccessible objects
Machines can refer to their own internal states, to numbers, and to symbolic patterns, i.e. what Woods [21] calls a 'completely accessible' world because semantic links between symbols and things in this world are directly derivedfrom simple causal links and the way symbols are used. In order to be useful as robots, or friends, machines will need to refer to external objects, events, locations, etc. The problem of external semantic linkage is harder to deal with.
Howcan a system use symbols to describe objects, properties, and relationships in a domain to which it has no direct access, and only incomplete evidence, so that it can never completely verify or falsify statements about the domain (likeu nobservables in physics)? Some external reference uses external causal links, such as sensors and motors. But direct links are often impossible, e.g. referring to events remote in space and time, or event o hypothetical objects in hypothetical situations. What alternative types of semantic link might there be?
Ak ey idea is that implicit, partial, definitions (e.g. in the form of an axiom system) enable newu ndefined concepts to be added to a language. AT arskian semantic theory does not, in general, allowm eanings to be fully determinate, since it will always be possible (except in very simple cases) to add further axioms constraining the possible models, and adding precision to the meanings of the terms. It is also generally possible to add axioms postulating additional entities and new relations between those entities and the previous ones, just as science advances partly by postulating newsorts of entities: atoms, genes, etc.
Combining our previously discussed internal causal links with Tarskian semantics, allows symbol-users to refer to their own internal states and also to very general possible states of possible worlds. This would permit mathematical thoughts and inventing possible physical universes and engaging in hypothetical reasoning about their inhabitants, properties, etc.
Are external causal connections required for thoughts about particular objects in the environment? (Compare Woods, McDermott [16] )
VII
Causal links arerequired for reference to actual particulars
No matter howm anyn ew symbols and axioms are added, Tarskian semantics will not of itself force the symbols to refer to anyp articular bit of reality rather anyo ther actual or possible bit of reality which has a similar structure and a similar network of relationships.
So the meanings defined simply by a set of axioms will always be totally universal, unless some of the symbols have a different sort of meaning, which attaches them to some individual portion of reality,f or instance symbols whose causal connections enable a machine to refer to its own innards, as described above.
Even without links through sensors and motors, an intelligent system might have symbols for a number of general relationships defined axiomatically,w hich could be used to express thoughts about howp ortions of the internal world are related to inaccessible objects. Examples of such relations are 'causes', 'before', 'inside', 'beyond'. Howe xactly 'cause' might be defined axiomatically is an old and unsolved problem. A sophisticated reasoning system might use the meta-leveln otion of a type of relationship whose detailed definition is not known, to build descriptions of relationships (of unknown types) between accessible objects and others (possibly of unknown types). Such a thinker might think of its owni nternal states as embedded in a larger structure, and start speculating about the properties of that structure, which it could refer to as: 'this world'.
Symbols causally linked to input and output transducers (sensors and motors) would have the ability to anchor reference to external particulars. Another example would be the use of demonstrativesl ike' here' and 'now' (and implicit use of such things in tensed verbs), which are linked to portions of space and time merely through the spatio-temporal nature of the system using them. (Compare Evans [4] .)
Attachment to specific portions of reality can be inherited by axiomatically defined terms, provided the axioms link them to other terms which have a more direct link. This does not imply that the external descriptors are explicitly definable in terms of symbols describing 'sense-data' as phenomenalists have supposed. (For more on this see [13] chapter 9.) Moreover, the inherent indeterminacyo fT arskian meanings explained above can neverb et otally removedb yl inks to symbols with more direct semantics. At best the indeterminacywill be partially reduced. For example, links between the concept 'electron' and what we can observei nar ange of experiments leave ito pen for the concept to be further specified in the future by theoretical and empirical discoveries concerning the internal nature of electrons and their causal powers.
VIII
Loop-closing semantics for non-propositional symbols
Id on'tr eally believe that birds, baboons or babies use logic with Tarskian semantics to enable them to perceive and act on things in the world. Yet there is no doubt that many animals have rich mental livesi ncluding thoughts of external objects. Might something other than logical and propositional representations explain this?
Ag eneralisation of Tarskian semantics may be more generally applicable to intelligent systems. There is no reason to suppose that all internal representations must be propositional. There are good reasons for using a variety of forms of representations, including analogical representations such as diagrams, maps, ordered lists, etc. (See [17] ).
We can define a non-Tarskian model for the internal representations which play a role in percepts, beliefs plans, etc., namely an external environment which can coherently close the feedback loops. This notion of coherent causal closure will be relative tot he system'sability to have precise and detailed goals and beliefs. Howspecific the mapping is between internal representations and external structures will depend on howrich and varied is the range of percepts, goals and action strategies the system can cope with.
LikeT arskian semantics, 'loop-closing semantics' leavesm eanings indeterminate. Fora ny lev elo fs pecification at which a loop-closing model can be found, there will be manyc onsistent extensions to lower-levels of causal structure (in the way that modern physics extends the environment known to our ancestors), which remain adequate models in this sense. Even for a givenlev elofdescription the internal representations may be more or less specific: for instance there will generally be infinitely manyp ossible hidden extensions to visible portions of objects consistent with what you knowa bout the world. Yo ur friend may have warts under his shirt.
The notion of loop-closing semantics presupposes a computational architecture rich enough to support distictions between different sorts of internal causal roles of symbols, in particular distinctions between (a) established beliefs (including percepts), (b) hypotheses aw aiting confirmation, (c) goals, and (d) plans and instructions. It is far from obvious what sort of design can support such role distinctions, and the consequential loop-closing model theory.
Some causal link is required if symbols are to refer to particular physical objects, like the Tower of London, or physical properties found in our world, such as magnetism. Without causal connections with the environment a thinker could only think (existentially quantified) thoughts about an abstract possible world, or very abstract and general thoughts about this world.
External links differ in kind. Besides visual, tactile, and other sensory links it is possible to have communication with other agents via a keyboard or other devices. I believe these are also capable of pinning down reference. Causal links can be more or less direct, and can convey more or less rich information. Communication via another agent is indirect, and generally provides limited but abstract and general information, but it is still a causal link, likefossil records.
So, using symbols to refer to an external world does not require that the world actually be directly sensed and acted on by the specific symbol-user.
IX
Extending 'mentalese': concept learning
Al anguage may be extended by the addition of newa xioms and procedures, partially and implicitly defining some newp rimitive symbols, and modifying the meanings of old ones. The history of concepts of science and mathematics shows that not all newly-acquired concepts need be translatable into one'sprevious symbolism.
After such learning, there is no clear functional distinction between the original concepts and the accreted language: we can memorise facts, formulas and instructions in English, instead of always having to translate into 'mentalese'. Hence, contrary to Fodor [5] , different humans (or machines) may use different 'mentalese' eveni ft heya ll started offthe same.
X
The essential incompleteness of semantics
We hav e seen that both Tarskian and loop-closing semantics leave symbols with partially indeterminate meanings. Causal links, likea dded axioms, reduce, but do not remove,t he indeterminacy. This incompleteness is evident in theoretical concepts of science, but can also be demonstrated in ordinary concepts.
In a sufficiently complext hinking system, event he language used for describing its own internal state will have this kind of indeterminateness and incompleteness, because of the problems of internal access sketched in chapter 10 of [13] .
XI
Can a computer distinguish 'true' and 'false'?
It is not clear howt od istinguish a 'true' from a 'false' boolean value, since formally they are symmetrical. The manual may say that 1 stands for 'true', but formally 1 could equally be interpreted as 'false', 0 as 'true', 'and' as 'or', 'or' as 'and' etc.. Could there be an asymmetry in the use of the symbol for 'true' and the symbol for 'false'?
One source of asymmetry lies in mechanisms that check assertions, instead of always blindly assuming them correct: an elementary form of self-consciousness. 'True' might label a tendencyt os urvive thorough checking. But the connection is not simple, for the result of checking may be wrong.
A' redundancyc onvention' could produce asymmetry.I nstead of using explicit booleans, adopt a convention that one of the boolean indicators is redundant: it is signified merely by the presence of a formula in an information store or a communication. Given negation, 'true' and 'false' then both become redundant labels.
Ad eeper asymmetry lies in connections between beliefs and autonomous motives. True beliefs are those which (generally) enable desires to be satisfied by rational planning. Again the connection is not simple, for a true belief can lead to a disastrous plan.
XII
Can understanding be truly duplicated, or only simulated?
Manyreaders will object to the suggestion that if certain formal conditions are satisfied by the processes in a machine, then it understands. This has been called the 'Strong AI' thesis. Ac ommon way of arguing against it is to describe a process which conforms to the allegedly sufficient conditions yet clearly does not involveunderstanding.
One supposed counter-example is a person who does not understand Chinese taking the place of a computer running a program allegedly capable of producing such understanding. Searle [11, 12] claims it would not if he were the person. Another type of example might be a subset of the atoms in a giant storm cloud, or some other randomly moving agglomeration -in principle some subset might happen to form a pattern which could be mapped onto the execution of a program. This would not mean that a storm-cloud had mental states. Another example might be a random number generator which happened to produce a succession of Godel numbers representing states of a machine following the program.
Full discussion of these objections would require analysis of different ways in which ap rogram may relate to processes which 'instantiate' it. Random connections clearly do not have the reliability required for a process which plays the role of understanding within an intelligent system. Though it is not so obvious, the same could be said of a process in which John Searle acts as a computer.The lack of reliability would be due to the potential for Searle'smotives, beliefs, distractions, tiredness, etc. to interfere with the running of the program. Thus the process would not satisfy the same set of counterfactual conditional descriptions as the process in a fully integrated intelligent system. Amore complete discussion would showhow certain sorts of local unreliability may be required, to allowm ore global processes to interrupt, modify,r e-direct, or abort subprocesses if theyd on ot conform to global requirements of the system. Thus local unreliability or unpredictability may enhance global coherence and reliability.
This leads to the conclusion that not every process which happens to have the right formal properties would constitute understanding (or anyo ther mental state ). The underlying mechanisms and the relationships to other parts of the system must have the right causal properties. There is nothing to prevent a computer having those properties, as fara sIk now. But the alleged refutations of the Strong AI thesis involves ystems which don'thav e the right properties. So theyare not refutations after all (compare [18] ).
If machines are to have mental states and processes of their own, theym ust have mechanisms with the right dispositional qualities. For example, merely having some kind of giant lookup table which enables an appropriate response to be produced in a very large set of possible situations would not be adequate. Ordinary understanding of a language involves having a capability with infinite generative power,n ot achievable by a finite condition-action table, eveni ft he table was large enough to survive a lifetime of testing. Understanding involves having dispositions or capabilities which go beyond the behaviour actually produced. (Compare Cohen'sd istinction beween 'simulated parotting' and 'simulated understanding' [2] .)
None of this provest he Strong AI thesis correct, of course. But it shows that setting up the right causal conditions for understanding (or other mental states) is not a trivial matter.R efutations of Strong AI must address themselves to systems where the reliability conditions are satisfied, not just the formal conditions.
XIII
Conclusion
A' design stance' helps to clarify the question whether machines themselves can understand symbols in a non-derivative way.I ti sn ot enough that machines appear from the outside to mimic human understanding: there must be a reliable basis for assuming that theycan display understanding in an open-ended range of situations, not all anticipated by the programmer.I h av e briefly described structural and functional design requirements for this, and argued that event he simplest computers use symbols in such a manner that the machines themselves associate meanings of a primitive sort with them.
Ihav e shown that a computer may use symbols to refer to its own internal states and to abstract objects; and indicated howitmight refer to a world to which it has only limited access, relying on the use of axiom-systems or perception-action loops to constrain possible interpretations. These constraints leave meanings partly indeterminate and indefinitely extendable. Causal links reduce but do not remove indeterminacy.
The full range of meaningful uses of symbols by human beings requires a type of architectural complexity not yet achievedinAIsystems.
There is a complexset of prototypical conditions for understanding, different subsets of which may be exemplified in different animals or machines, yielding a large space of possible systems which we are only just beginning to explore. Our ordinary labels are not suited to drawing a definite global boundary within such a space. At best we can analyse the implications of manydifferent boundaries, all very important. This requires a long term multi-disciplinary exploration.
